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31 Introduction
This licentiate’s thesis analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small
open economy under a flexible exchange rate regime, assuming that the government
spends exclusively on domestically produced goods. The motivation for this research
comes from the observation that the literature on the new open economy
macroeconomics1 (NOEM) has focused almost exclusively on two-country global
models and the analyses of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy on small
economies are almost completely ignored. In choosing a small country setting, this
thesis focuses on a simpler framework, but it brings in interesting insights into the
effects of fiscal policy in open economies.
After the seminal paper ”Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux” (1995) by Obstfeld and
Rogoff, the profession started to use the term new open economy macroeconomics to
describe research on open economy macroeconomics that integrates typical Keynesian
features, imperfect competition and nominal rigidities, into a dynamic general
equilibrium framework. These new open economy macroeconomic models are based
on the assumption that nominal rigidities and market imperfections in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework better describe the reality. Furthermore, the adoption of
a dynamic utility-theoretic approach by the NOEM literature allows an explicit utility-
based welfare analysis of fiscal policy, and can thus be used as the basis for the design
of optimal fiscal policy.
This thesis presents two analytically tractable models to study the positive and
normative effects of permanent balanced-budget fiscal expansion in a small open
economy under a flexible exchange rate regime. As stressed by Sarno (2001), the
NOEM literature has shown that the effects of economic policies in this framework
have turned out to be sensitive to the specification of preferences. As mentioned, the
1 See Lane (2001b) for an excellent survey on the NOEM literature.
4NOEM literature neglects the study of the effects of fiscal policy in small open
economies. Therefore, this thesis aims at filling in this gap by illustrating how the
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a small open economy depend on the
specification of preferences. In this thesis I present two extensions to the small open
economy model contained in the Appendix to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). The aim of
the first model is to analyze the positive and normative effects of fiscal policy, making
use of a model that exploits the idea of modelling private and government
consumption as substitutes in private utility. The model offers simple and intuitive
predictions on how fiscal expansion affects the economy, and it clearly demonstrates
how the effects depend on the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government consumption. The aim of the second model is to analyze the relationship
between fiscal policy, output, the exchange rate and the current account. The focus of
this model is to study how the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables
depend on the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of some
of the NOEM models that address fiscal policy issues. Section 3 introduces the model
that makes use of the idea of modelling private and government consumption as
substitutes in private utility. This section demonstrates how the macroeconomic effects
of fiscal policy depend on the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government consumption. Section 4 lays out the model which is used to analyze the
effects of fiscal policy on output, the current account and the exchange rate. This
section illustrates how the effects of fiscal policy depend on the elasticity of
substitution between traded and nontraded goods. Section 6 briefly summarizes the
thesis and provides conclusions.
52 Fiscal Policy in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics
Starting with the celebrated article by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), the field of open
economy macroeconomics has witnessed the development of a new generation of
economic models, generally referred as new open economy macroeconomic models2.
These models integrate typical Keynesian features, imperfect competition and nominal
rigidities, into a dynamic general equilibrium framework. The main attention in the
NOEM literature has been on the analysis of monetary shocks, and the analysis of
fiscal shocks have received, at least relative to monetary shocks, little attention. For
example, in an excellent survey article on the NOEM literature Lane (2001b) points
this out, also pointing out a reason why the analysis of monetary shocks have received
so much attention in the NOEM literature. “In describing the findings of this research
program [NOEM], I focus exclusively on the analysis of monetary shocks. This reflects
the emphasis in the literature, for the role of nominal rigidities is mostly starkly
illustrated in the case of monetary shocks and it is this kind of disturbance that
flexible-price models are least well-equipped to handle.” (Lane 2001, 236; italicization
added)
However, an explicitly optimizing, general equilibrium framework also provides a
very potential framework for analysing fiscal policy issues. Since new open economy
macroeconomic models use solid microfoundations for intertemporal choice,
equilibrium conditions are derived from optimal individual behaviour on part of
consumers and producers, and due to the general equilibrium framework, equilibrium
conditions are consistent with the simultaneous clearing of all markets. For these
reasons, the new models have much stronger theoretical foundations than traditional
Keynesian models, and in contrast with models in the flexible-price framework, the
new paradigm has one feature that gives them an edge over flexible-price models: the
2 For more detailed analysis on new open economy macro models, see survey articles. An excellent
survey by Lane (2001b) focuses completely on monetary policy issues. Ganelli and Lane (2002) survey
more recent developments in the NOEM literature and also contributions that address fiscal policy
issues, while Coutinho (2003) focuses completely on fiscal policy issues.
6presence of nominal rigidities. In addition, the adoption of an explicit utility function
gives an opportunity to investigate the welfare effects of fiscal policy, and the analysis
can thus be used as the basis for the design of optimal fiscal policy.
The purpose of the remainder of the section is twofold. First, is tries to provide an
overview of some of the NOEM models that address fiscal policy issues. Second, it
pays attention to the facts how government spending can be introduced into NOEM
models and how fiscal shocks affect economies. I cover two models in more detail, the
OR model in which government spending is assumed to bring no utility and a model
by Ganelli (2003) in which government spending affect utility in a non-separable way.
2.1 The Obstfeld-Rogoff Model
As mentioned, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) effectively initiated the new paradigm. In
this section I briefly outline the main features and results of the textbook version of the
OR model (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1996). They developed a perfect-foresight two-country
general equilibrium model. In their model the world is populated by a continuum of
infinitely-lived agents (indexed by z) that are both consumers and monopolistic
producers of a continuum of differentiated goods. The home agents are on the interval
[0,n], while the foreign agents are on the interval (n,1]. The OR model focuses on the
case where there is no home bias in government spending, but government spending is
assumed to be pure waste and does not affect private utility at all. In addition, prices
are sticky, in the producer’s currency, as they are set one period in advance and fully
flexible after the period. It follows from this assumption that it takes one period to
reach the new steady state after a fiscal shock hits the economy.
In the model, the lifetime utility of representative home agent z is given by3
3 I present here the 1996 version of the OR model. The difference between the 1995 article version and
the 1996 textbook version (with respect to fiscal issues) is the functional form of real money balances in
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In this equation Ut denotes utility at time t, b (0 < b < 1) is the discount factor, C is the
consumption index (a composite of consumption of individual goods) defined as
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where c(z) is consumption of good z, and ? (> 1) is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. In the utility function ? is the parameter, Ms is nominal money
balances held by the agent at time s and PS is the price level. The last term captures the
disutility of work effort, ys(z) is the output of good z and ? is the parameter. (Obstfeld
– Rogoff 1995, 661)
Government spending is introduced into the model as a composite of goods,
aggregated in the same way as for private consumption with same elasticity of
substitution. Accordingly, government spending is given by
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which indicates that there is no home bias in government spending. In this framework
the representative agent faces the constant-elasticity demand curve for his output
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which indicates that demand for good z depends on its relative price, the elasticity of
demand with respect to relative price, and aggregate private and government
expenditures. (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 700)
As mentioned, prices are sticky in the short run (for one period) and fully flexible after
the period. In the short run, output is entirely demand-determined. A permanent
the utility function. The 1995 version assumes ( ) ( )ec e -- 11PM , where ? is the elasticity of money
demand. However, the 1996 version assumes a logarithmic function.
8balanced-budget rise in government spending then reduces short-run relative (relative
to the foreign country) consumption, depreciates the nominal exchange rate and
increases relative output. With no home bias in government spending, the rise in
government spending increases demand for both domestic and foreign goods, while
the tax bill falls entirely on the domestic agents. The rise in government spending
increases domestic incomes (output), but not enough to offset the rise in taxes.
Consequently, the rise in government spending leads to an immediate fall in relative
consumption. Since money demand is a positive function of consumption (not a
function of gross income), lower money demand requires a rise in the price level and a
depreciation of the domestic currency. The depreciation induces the expenditure-
switching effect, raising demand for domestic goods and lowering demand for foreign
good, further rising relative output in the home country. When the agents smooth
consumption and short-run income rises by more than long-run income, the home
country runs a current account surplus in the short-run. In addition, the rise in
government spending leads to a fall on the real interest rate in anticipation of lower
consumption in the future. (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 704–705)
After one period all price are fully flexible and the economy reaches the new steady
state. In the steady state, when the economy is again on the labour supply curve, the
permanent rise in government spending induces a rise in relative home output and a
fall in relative consumption. As in the short run, higher taxes bring about a negative
wealth effect for the home agents inducing the agents to cut their consumption and
also increase their labour supply. Since the agents supply more labour, output rises and
consequently home consumption falls by less than the rise in government spending.
The current account surplus in the short run makes the agents wealthier and this higher
wealth leads to some reduction in work effort and output. The former effect dominates,
and the rise in government spending decreases steady-state relative home consumption
and increases output, and therefore allows private consumption to fall by less than the
rise in government spending. (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 703)
9The welfare effect of fiscal policy is the sum of short-run change in utility and the
discounted present value of the steady state change in utility. Since the utility function
depends positively on private consumption, negatively on output and government
spending does not bring utility in this model, the above analysis suggests that fiscal
expansion decreases domestic welfare, but it increases it abroad. The main reason for
the beggar-thyself nature of fiscal expansion is that the increase in world demand falls
on both home and foreign goods, but the taxes that finance it are borne entirely by the
home agents. Obviously, the welfare effects are sensitive to the way in which
government spending affects private utility. (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 706) But on the
other hand, “the positive results that follow [from the pure waste case] would be the
same if government spending entered separably into preferences.” (Obstfeld – Rogoff
1996, 700).
Although, the Obstfeld-Rogoff model is a two-country global model it can be used for
the analysis of small economies by taking the limit of the two-county model as the
other country’s relative size goes to zero (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 688). It is apparent
that a small country’s expansion has no effect on the world interest rate or world
output. On the other hand, the other effects of fiscal expansion are the same in the
small-country case as in the two-country global model.
Ganelli (2005) introduces home bias in the OR model. With complete home bias in
government spending, the domestic government consumption index is given by
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When domestic temporary fiscal expansion stimulates demand for home goods only, a
rise in government spending increases domestic output on a one-to-one basis, while the
nominal exchange rate, home and foreign consumption are unaffected in the short run.
This is a consequence of the fact that, when home government spending falls
exclusively on domestically produced goods the rise in government spending increases
domestic incomes (output). Thus the wealth costs (taxes) of this policy for the
domestic agents are perfectly offset by the gains from the stimulation of domestic
10
demand. Therefore, there is no effect on domestic consumption. And since money
demand is a function of (unchanged) consumption, fiscal expansion has no effect on
the exchange rate and the interest rate. With no effect on foreign demand and the
exchange rate, the introduction of home bias in government spending isolates the
economy with respect to fiscal policy.
A number of modifications of and extensions to the OR model has been done.
However, virtually all the models in the NOEM literature that address fiscal policy
issues concentrate on the simple case where government spending does not affect
private utility at all. Only two NOEM models with utility enhancing government
spending have been published so far: Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) in which government
spending is assumed to affect private utility in an additively separable way and Ganelli
(2003) in which government spending affects utility in a non-separable way.
2.2 NOEM Models with Useful Government Spending
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) introduce useful government spending into the NOEM
framework by assuming that government spending affect utility in an additively
separable way. However, advantages of the introduction of useful government
spending in an additively separable way into are modest. As mentioned, positive
results change only by having government spending entering directly in the utility
function. On the other hand, the welfare effects of fiscal policy can be totally different
if government spending affects utility in an additively separable way. Nonetheless,
Corsetti and Pesenti did not specify the functional form of individual utility from
government spending, and probably for this reason, they did not analyse the effects of
fiscal expansion on domestic welfare.
Ganelli (2003) presents an extension to the OR model which introduces utility
enhancing government spending by modelling private and government consumption as
substitutes in private utility. Otherwise the model by Ganelli maintained all other
11
assumptions of the OR model. The main contribution of the model is that of studying
the consequences of the introduction of the useful government spending on output and
consumption multipliers. The intertemporal utility function is given by
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where ? is the marginal rate of substitution between private and government
consumption. The preceding formulation implies a direct crowding-out effect of
government spending on private consumption when government provides goods that
are substitutes for private consumption. A salient feature of the introduction utility
enhancing government spending in a non-separable way is that the first-order
conditions change and consequently both the positive and normative effect of fiscal
expansion change relative to the pure waste case (? = 0). (Ganelli 2003, 90–91)
As in the OR model, a permanent rise in government spending reduce consumption,
depreciates the nominal exchange rate and increases output. Maintaining the
assumption of no home bias in government spending, the policy makes the home
agents poorer. Therefore, they react by reducing their consumption. When private and
government consumption are substitutes the fall in private consumption is bigger than
in the pure waste case due to direct crowding-out. An odd consequence of government
spending directly entering the utility function is that private money demand is not only
a positive function on private consumption but also on government consumption (?G).
Consequently, the positive effect on money demand (due to a rise in government
spending) partially offsets the negative effect (due to a fall in consumption). Therefore,
the introduction of useful government spending implies a depreciation of the home
currency that is diminished as ? increases. When ? = 1 the effects perfectly offset each
other and the effect on the nominal exchange rate is zero. Due to the exchange rate
movement the effect of the rise in government spending on output is positive.
However, this effect is decreasing in ?. The exchange rate change and direct crowding-
out induce that the rise in government spending causes a smaller positive impact on
output compared to the pure waste case. In addition, as in the OR model, the economy
runs a current account suplus in the short run. (Ganelli 2003, 94–97)
12
In the long run, as in the OR model, higher taxes bring about a negative wealth effect
for the home agents inducing the agents to cut their consumption and increase labour
supply. The long-run effects on consumption and output go in the same direction as the
short-run ones, but in the long run consumption fall by less than in the short run. The
fact that government and private consumption are substitutes has a crowding-out effect
on private consumption, as consumption falls by more than in the pure waste case. The
effect of a rise in government spending on output is positive but decreasing in ?. Thus,
the introduction of useful government spending implies a smaller positive impact on
output compared to the pure waste case. As in the OR model the current account
surplus in the short run makes the agents wealthier in the long run, which leads to
some reduction in labour effort. (Ganelli 2003, 99–100)
The above analysis shows that the introduction of useful government spending reduces
consumption and output compared to the pure waste case. These effects must be
weighted against the fact that government spending now directly affects private utility.
The direct increase in utility from government spending and a positive effect on leisure
more than offset the negative welfare effect arising from the reduction in consumption
due to direct crowding-out. Therefore, the introduction of utility enhancing
government spending unambiguously increases welfare compared to the pure waste
benchmark. Whether the introduction of utility enhancing government spending is
strong enough to reverse the beggar-thyself result depends on the specific parameter
values. (Ganelli 2003, 100–101)
The NOEM literature has focused almost exclusively on two-country global models.
As emphasised by Lane (2001, 256) advantages of this approach are that it highlights
international transmission channels, allows interest rates and asset prices to be
determined in international capital markets and permits the analysis of international
policy interdependence. But he also pointed out that: “However, these benefits come at
the price of considerable model complexity and may not be compelling importance for
the analysis of small open economies.”
13
3 The Effects of Fiscal Policy: The Role of Useful Government
Spending
The purpose of this section is to examine how permanent balanced-budget fiscal
expansion affects a small open economy under a flexible exchange rate regime,
making use of a model with utility enhancing government spending. The main
motivation for this research comes from the observation that most models in the
NOEM literature assume that government spending brings no utility, which can be
interpreted as an oversimplified assumption. The main focus of this section is to
examine how the effects of fiscal expansion depend on the marginal rate of
substitution between private and government consumption. The second purpose of the
section is to implement a detailed utility-based welfare analysis of fiscal policy. This
section attempts to fill in the gap in the literature by analyzing the effects of fiscal
expansion in a small open economy in a framework where fiscal policy shocks can
have a direct crowding-out effect on private consumption.
As mentioned in the introduction section, the model I present in this section combines
the small open economy model contained in the Appendix to Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) with the idea of modelling private and government consumption as substitutes
in private utility. As emphasized by Ganelli (2003), one drawback of the recent NOEM
literature is that government spending is normally assumed to be pure waste or to
affect private utility in an additively separable way. The idea of specifying preferences
in a non-separable way and modelling private and government consumption as
substitutes in private utility is advantageous: in this framework government
consumption can have a direct crowding-out effect on private consumption. The idea
of viewing government consumption as substitute for private consumption was
pioneered by Bailey (1971, Section 9), who studied the direct crowding-out effect in
the IS-LM model. The topic was also studied in the IS-LM model by Buiter (1977). An
important contribution to the topic was done by Barro (1981 & 1989), who studied
direct crowding-out in the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy. Studies that address
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direct crowding-out also include Heijdra and Ligthart (1997), who used a static closed
economy model with imperfect competition. In the Real Business Cycle framework
(perfect competition, flexible price-models), the topic has been studied by Roche
(1996) and Finn (1998). Making use of the NOEM framework, Ganelli (2003) studied
the consequences of modelling private and government consumption as substitutes on
consumption and output multipliers and welfare in a two-country global model.
3.1 A Model
In this section, I develop a perfect-foresight general equilibrium model to analyze the
effects of fiscal policy. Specifying preferences, technology, demand functions and
budget constraints starts the presentation of the model, after which needed first-order
conditions are derived. Then we solve for an initial (zero government spending) steady
state. To study the dynamic effects of fiscal policy, a log-linear approximation around
the initial steady state is used. Since prices are sticky in the short run (by assumption),
and flexible in the long run, the solution allows for distinguishing the impact of the
first-period and the steady-state effects of fiscal expansion. This creates an opportunity
to examine both the short-run and the long-run effects of fiscal expansion.
3.1.1 Market Structure and Preferences
The assumption about imperfect competition is a pivotal factor of the model. Firstly,
the effects on fiscal expansion in an imperfectly competitive economy are important
and interesting in the sense that the equilibrium in imperfectly competitive economies
is not Pareto-efficient. For that reason, it is possible that expansive fiscal policy brings
output closer to the social optimum and increases welfare. Secondly, in the imperfectly
competitive equilibrium prices are above the social optimum and policies that increase
output are more likely to be a welfare increasing compared to in perfectly competitive
economies. Thirdly, in imperfect competition prices are above marginal costs, and it is
15
profitable to meet unexpected demand at the present price. This serves as a
justification of the assumption of demand-determined output in the short-run.
As mentioned, I consider a small-country model in which the nontraded goods sector
is monopolistically competitive, with an elastic labour supply and prices sticky in the
short-run. The home country is populated by a continuum of consumer-producers
(agents) that are indexed by z Î [0,1]. As producers, they all produce, using their own
labour as input differentiated perishable nontraded goods which are also indexed by z.
As consumers, they consume all goods produced in the home country. The traded
goods sector has a single homogeneous output that is priced in the competitive world
market. As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), the output of tradables is exogenous as the
agents are endowed with a constant quantity of tradables in each period.
Preferences are specified in such a way that the model combines the idea that
government consumption affects utility in a non-separable way. A representative home
agent maximizes his/her intertemporal utility function that depends positively on
private consumption, (per-capita) government spending and real balances and,
negatively, on output because of the disutility cost of producing it. The lifetime utility
of agent z is given by
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where Ut denotes utility at time t, b (0 < b < 1) is the discount factor, CT,s is
consumption of tradables at time s, and ? is the share of tradables in total consumption.
The variable CN,s is the private nontraded goods consumption index (a composite of
differentiated varieties of nontraded goods), defined as
(2)
11
0
1
)(
--
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
= ò
q
q
q
q
dzzcCN ,
where ? (> 1) is the elasticity of substitution between varieties of nontraded goods (and
also the price elasticity of demand of a single good z) and c(z) is consumption of good
z. Per capita government consumption, GN, is the government consumption index that
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is aggregated in the same manner as private nontraded goods consumption, and with
the same elasticity of substitution4
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where g(z) is government consumption of good z. In equation (1), ? ( 10 ££ a ) is the
marginal rate of substitution between private and government nontraded goods
consumption, and it therefore reflects the utility that consumers get from government
consumption. In the utility function (1), c (> 0) is the parameter and Ms is nominal
money balances held by the agent at time s. Ps is the consumption-based price index
(defined below). The last term in (1) captures the disutility of work effort, ys(z) is the
output of good z, and k (> 0) is the parameter. The production function can take the
form y = AL?, where L stands for labour input, A technology and ? < 1.
The consumption-based price index, defined as the minimum cost of purchasing one
unit of private composite consumption, is
(3)
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In this equation, ? and 1 - ? denote the shares of private consumption of traded and
nontraded goods in total private consumption, respectively. The variable PT is the price
of tradables. The law of one price holds in tradables, as we assume that there are no
costs or impediments to trade between the home country and the world market. For
simplicity, we can normalize the exogenously determined world price of tradables (the
foreign currency price of it) to unity, which then implies PT = E, where E denotes the
nominal exchange rate, defined as the home currency price of foreign currency. Hence,
the price of tradables is proportional to the nominal exchange rate. The variable PN in
equation (3) is the nontraded goods price index. It follows from equation (2) that the
nontraded goods price index is
4 The assumption that private and government consumption have the same elasticity of demand rules out
the possibility that a rise in government spending would change the elasticity of total demand.
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where p(z) is the price of nontraded good z.
The preferences assumed here imply that the producers of nontraded goods face the
downward-sloping (constant-elasticity-of-substitution) demand curves
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where superscript A is used to denote aggregates. This equation indicates that demand
for a good depends on its relative price, the elasticity of demand with respect to
relative price and aggregate (per-capita) nontraded goods expenditures.
3.1.2 Budget Constraints and Utility Maximization
To complete the specification of the individual’s problem, we need to write down
budget constraints faced by the private agents. In every period, the representative
individual is subject to the budget constraint
(5)
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where Bt denotes the stock of riskless real bonds (denominated in tradables) held by
the agent entering period t + 1, Mt is the agent’s money balances entering period t + 1,
r denotes the constant world net interest rate earned on bonds between periods t - 1 and
t, tTy , is exogenously given quantity of tradables and ? is per capita taxes denominated
in units of nontraded goods.
The government is assumed to provide nontraded goods, free of charge, to the agents.
The governmentally provided goods can be utility enhancing to the agents; however,
as modelling assumes that individual utility depends on per-capita government
consumption these goods cannot be “public goods” in sense of being nonrival goods
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(Barro 1981, 1090). As noted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 628–629), Ricardian
equivalence holds in this framework, thus nothing is lost by assuming that all
government spending is financed by non-distortionary taxes and seigniorage. The
government budget constraint, expressed in per capita terms and in units of nontraded
goods, can be written as
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The representative home agent maximizes the utility function (1) subject to the budget
constraint specified in equation (5). In this framework, an increase in nontraded output
lowers its price and this has to be taken into account. As shown in Appendix A, the
first-order conditions for the maximization problem of the representative agent can be
written (the indexes denoting the agents are dropped):
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where i is the nominal interest rate defined by the Fisher identity5
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Equation (6) is the standard consumption Euler equation. It implies that the
representative agent smooth consumption of tradables independently of nontraded
goods production or consumption. For simplicity, I assume equality of the discount
rate and the world interest rate, which then implies that the optimal time path for
tradables consumption is perfectly flat. Equation (7) governs the optimal allocation of
total consumption spending between tradables and nontraded goods. The ratio of the
5 Note that, because the price of tradables also denotes the nominal exchange rate the Fisher identity
implies uncovered interest parity.
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marginal utilities of tradables to nontraded goods equals the relative price of tradables
to nontraded goods. Thus, the time path of nontraded goods consumption is tilted by
changes in the relative price of tradables to nontraded goods. Equation (8) is the
labour-leisure trade-off condition that ensures that the marginal disutility of producing
an extra unit of a nontraded good is equal to the marginal utility from consuming the
added revenue that the extra unit of the nontraded good brings.  The equation indicates
that labour supply is a positive function of aggregate government expenditure, but it is
also a negative function of government consumption. The reason why labour supply is
a negative function of government consumption is the following: An increase in ?G
reduces the marginal utility of private consumption, inducing the agents to substitute
into leisure out of work. Equation (9) is the money market equilibrium condition
which indicates that demand for real balances is a positive function of private and
government consumption (instead of being only a function of gross income) and a
negative function of the interest rate. Also according to the money market equilibrium
condition (see equation (A6)) the agents must get same utility from spending money
today (consuming a unit of the consumption good) or from holding money today and
using today’s money for consumption tomorrow (at t + 1). The optimal amount of
money balances is chosen such that the marginal utility of private consumption equals
the marginal utility of real balances. This fact can be used to understand why demand
for real balances is a positive function of government consumption (follows Ganelli
2003): An increase in ?G reduces the marginal utility of private consumption, inducing
the agents to substitute private consumption with real balances. Therefore, demand for
real balances is a positive function of government consumption.
3.1.3 A Symmetric Steady State Equilibrium
In order to solve the model I am going to use a log-linear approximation around a
steady state. On the choice of the steady state I follow the OR model. Firstly, it is
convenient to log-linearize the model around a steady state in which initial net foreign
asset and government expenditure are both zero (B0 = 0 and G0 = 0, where zero
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subscripts denote the initial steady state), and all prices are fully flexible and all
exogenous variables are constant. Secondly, the endowment of tradables can be
normalized so that the relative price of nontraded goods in terms of tradables is unity.
Thirdly, in a symmetric equilibrium, all agents set the same price, and consume and
produce the same amount of the differentiated good in the economy. In addition, we
assume that all agents consume the same amount of governmentally provided goods.
Then the equilibrium on the market for nontraded goods imply
A
N
A
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From the Euler equation for tradables consumption follows that the intertemporal
profile of tradables consumption is flat. And given that the output of tradables is
constant and initial holding of net foreign asset is zero, these assumptions imply that
consumption of tradables is constant in every period. Thus shocks to the output or
consumption of nontraded goods do not have spillover effects on tradables
consumption. Consequently, the economy has a balanced current account and fiscal
policy does not lead to international redistribution of wealth through current account
imbalances.
In the initial zero government spending steady state tNtN yC ,, = , thus the first-order
condition governing each the agents’ optimal choice of the output of nontraded goods,
equation (8), then implies that the steady-state output of nontraded goods is given by
(as in the small-country OR model)
(10) ( )( ) 2
1
0.
11
úû
ù
êë
é --=
qk
qg
Ny .
Because each agent has monopoly power over the nontraded good she/he produces, the
home output is suboptimally low in the decentralised competitive equilibrium. Too see
this note that a benevolent social planner (SP) would maximize total utility from the
output (consumption) of nontraded goods
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Implying that
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This clearly indicates that the output level in the decentralised competitive equilibrium
is below the output level realized a benevolent social planner. Hence, it is possible that
fiscal expansion can increase output closer to the social optimum and increase welfare.
In addition, the preceding equations show that the degree of monopolistic distortion
determines by how much the output level the initial steady state is below the socially
optimal output level. As the elasticity of demand increases, the differentiated
nontraded goods become closer substitutes, and consequently the monopoly power
decreases.
3.2 The Effects of Fiscal Expansion
Now I turn to analysis of the effects of unanticipated permanent balanced-budget fiscal
expansion. Assume that prices of nontraded goods sticky, as they are set one period in
advance and fully flexible after the period. It follows from this assumption that it takes
one period to reach the new steady state after a fiscal shock hits the economy. The next
step is to solve for the steady-state effects of a fiscal shock when prices are flexible
and all variables except government spending are constant.
3.2.1 The Steady State Effects of Fiscal Expansion
As mentioned above, as the next step, I use a log-linear approximation of the model
around the initial (zero government spending) steady state. Each variable are expressed
in deviations from the initial steady state, and the short run and the long run deviations
are denoted as follows
0
ˆ
x
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Since initial steady-state government spending is zero, government spending is
normalized by initial consumption of nontraded goods.
Taking logarithmic transformation and then the first-order Taylor expansion
( )00 )( xxxf -¢  from the goods-market equilibrium condition and from the labour-
leisure trade-off condition (8) using above mentioned definitions one can get
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These equations can be solved to yield
(11) NN GC
ˆ
2
1ˆ ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +-=
a  and
(12) NN Gy
ˆ
2
1ˆ ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -=
a .
The interpretation of equations (11) and (12) is the following: First, permanent
balanced-budget fiscal expansion raises the steady-state output of nontraded goods
(unless ? = 1) and crowds out private consumption. The steady-state output increases
as the agents respond to fiscal expansion by substituting into work out of leisure.
Consequently, private consumption falls by less than the rise in government spending.
Second, when the governmentally provided goods are utility enhancing to the agents
(that is ? > 0, instead of ? = 0), the consumption and output multipliers are reduced by
an amount that is increasing in ?. It implies that the higher the substitutability is
between private and government consumption (higher value of ?), (i) the bigger is the
crowding-out effect on private consumption (ii) and the smaller is the positive impact
on output (as in Ganelli 2003). The effects clearly indicate the logic of direct
crowding-out: when the government provides goods that are substitutes for private
consumption, the fall in consumption is bigger than in the pure waste case. If the
marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption is less than
one, the economy reaches an equilibrium which corresponds to lower private
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consumption and higher output levels relative to the initial steady-state allocation.
However, if government consumption is perfect substitute with private consumption (?
= 1) a rise in government spending does not affect the output of nontraded goods but it
indeed crowds out private consumption on a one-to-one basis.
As I showed in Section 3.3, the initial steady-state output of nontraded goods is
inefficiently low because of the monopolistic distortion. A rise in government
spending which induces an increase in labour supply (requires ? < 1) consequently
brings the output level of nontraded goods closer to the social optimum. A rise in
government spending can thus abate the distortion caused by monopolistic
competition. However, the flip side of the coin is that a rise in government spending
crowds out private consumption, and as private consumption falls by less than ?GN
increases, “effective consumption”of nontraded goods (that is CN + ?GN) falls.
Effective consumption, which was already suboptimally low, is thus driven even lower
and farther away from its social optimal level.
To solve for NPˆ , one can substitute equation (11) into the log-linearized money market
equilibrium condition to yield
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According to equation (13), fiscal expansion raises the nontraded goods price index, if
governmentally provided goods are not perfect substitutes with private consumption.
Higher government spending leads to an outward shift in the demand curve facing the
agents, therefore allowing them to raise their prices. The preceding equation implies a
role for the marginal rate of substitution between private and government
consumption: the smaller the substitutability is the greater is the positive impact on the
nontraded goods price index. In addition, the rise in the nontraded goods price index is
proportional to that in the output of nontraded goods.
If ? is less than one, a rise in the nontraded goods price index is necessary is order to
maintain the money market equilibrium. In this case, a rise in government spending
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crowds out private consumption by more than ?G raises, thus “effective consumption”
of nontraded goods deceases, which lowers money demand. The reduction in
“effective consumption” of nontraded goods then implies that in order to maintain
equilibrium in the money market, money demand must increase, requiring a rise in the
nontraded goods price index. This rise increases money demand, causing equilibrium
in the money market.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, tradables consumption is constant in every period
implying that 0ˆˆ == TT CC . Thus the log-linearized version of equation (7), which
governs the optimal allocation of total consumption spending between tradables and
nontraded goods, is
NTNN PPGC
ˆˆˆˆ -=+a .
Substituting equations (11) and (13) into the preceding equation yield to 0ˆ =TP . The
startling implication of this equation is that fiscal expansion does not affect the
nominal exchange rate (the price of tradables is proportional to the exchange rate).
From the allocation of total consumption spending between tradables and nontraded
goods, it is known that in an optimal case, the ratio of the marginal utilities of
tradables to nontraded goods equals the relative price of tradables to nontraded goods.
Consumption of tradables does not change, which implies that the marginal utility of
consumption of tradables is constant over time. If ? is less than one, the reduction in
“effective consumption” increases the marginal utility of consumption of nontraded
goods. Hence, in order to maintain the optimal allocation of total consumption
spending, an adjustment in the relative price ratio is needed. As mentioned, because of
the increase in demand for nontraded goods it is optimal for the agents to increase their
prices. Since the price of tradables remains constant, the relative price of nontraded
goods increases. As a result, the rise in the nontraded goods price index and the
reduction in “effective consumption” of nontraded goods guarantee that the ratio of the
marginal utilities equals the relative price ratio without an adjustment in the price of
tradables. However, if ? is one, "effective consumption" does not change, which
25
implies that the marginal utility of "effective consumption" does not change.
Therefore, an adjustment in the relative price is not needed.
One can use the log-linear version of the price index equation (3), with TPˆ  unchanged
and NPˆ  given by equation (13), to yield the steady-state change in the consumption-
based price index
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The preceding equation clearly indicates that the rise in the consumption-based price
index is determined by the rise in the nontraded goods price index and the share of
private consumption of nontraded goods in total private consumption.
3.2.2 Short Run Equilibrium Response to Fiscal Expansion
The next step is to solve for the short-run effects of fiscal expansion when prices in the
nontraded goods sector are sticky. The assumption of sticky prices introduces a typical
Keynesian feature in the model: output is entirely demand determined (for small
enough expansion) in the period following a fiscal shock. Since output is demand-
determined the labour-leisure trade-off equation (8) does not hold. To solve for the
short-run effects of a fiscal shock on private consumption and output one can log-
linearize equation (7) and the money market equilibrium condition (9), keeping in
mind that 0ˆ =TP , to yield
TNN PGC ˆˆˆ =+ a  and
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Together these equations imply that TPˆ must be zero. A rise in government spending
raises money demand, thus in order to maintain equilibrium in the money market,
money demand must fall. Demand for money falls, when the prices of nontraded goods
are sticky, if the nominal interest rate rises and/or consumption decreases. Since the
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nominal interest rate is defined by the Fisher identity and the nominal rate is
unchanged in the steady state, the rise in nominal interest rate means an appreciation of
the currency. Thereby, in order to balance money demand with supply, consumption
must fall and/or the currency must appreciate. The latter is, however, inconsistent with
the optimal allocation of total consumption spending. In the short run, when both
tradables consumption and the prices of nontraded goods are constant, private
consumption has to decrease and/or the price of tradables raise. Otherwise the ratio of
the marginal utilities of tradables to nontraded goods does not equal their relative price
ratio. The only means to both allocate total consumption spending optimally and to
maintain the money market equilibrium simultaneously is a fall in private consumption
with an unchanged exchange rate. The following equation, therefore, has to hold
NN GC ˆˆ a-= . (14)
Combining this with the log-linear demand equation one can get
(15) ( ) NN Gy ˆ1ˆ a-= .
Equations (14) and (15) imply that the short-run effects on consumption and output of
fiscal expansion go in the same direction as the steady state effects, if 0 < ? < 1: Fiscal
expansion increases short-run output and crowds out private consumption. Comparing
equation (12), which gives the steady-state rise in output, with equation (15), one can
see that the rise in output is higher in the short run. On the other hand from equations
(11) and (14), one can see that the crowding-out effect is smaller in the short run.
Equations (14) and (15) strengthen the argument that when government spending is
useful, the output and consumption multipliers are reduced by an amount that is
increasing in ?: The higher the substitutability between private and government
consumption, (i) the smaller is the positive effect on output (ii) and the bigger is the
crowding-out effect on private consumption. A rise in government spending leaves the
exchange rate unaffected, due to the reasons discussed above, and thereby it does not
cause crowding-out or crowding-in through exchange rate changes. The expansionary
effect of fiscal policy is offset only to the extent that governmentally provided goods
are substitutes for private consumption. There are no other effects on private
consumption – only the direct crowding-out effect.
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The model presented here yields important insights into the effectiveness of fiscal
policy in small open economies. In the case when government spending is pure waste,
it can be seen from equation (15), that the “balanced budget multiplier” is exactly one.
This result is in sharp contrast with the result derived from the Mundell-Fleming
model. In the Mundell-Fleming model, the effectiveness of fiscal policy on output in a
small open economy depends primarily on whether the exchange rate is flexible or
fixed. In a flexible exchange rate regime, a rise in government spending tends to
increase money demand raising the interest rate, thus capital inflows attracted by the
higher interest rate appreciate the exchange rate. This appreciation induces an
expenditure-switching effect which causes complete crowding-out, and consequently
fiscal policy becomes ineffective and the “balanced budget multiplier” becomes zero.
In this model, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is independent of the exchange rate
regime. This effectiveness is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between
private and government consumption, and only in the case when private and
government consumption are perfect substitutes is fiscal policy unable to influence
output. In this case fiscal policy only affects the composition of aggregate demand, but
not the level of output.
In summary, a permanent rise in government spending generates a short-run increase
in the output of nontraded goods (unless ? = 1), but it leaves the current account and
the nominal exchange rate unaffected. Since the price of tradables is unchanged and
the prices of nontraded goods are sticky, the consumption-based price index remains in
the pre-shock level. After one period, the prices of nontraded goods are adjusted and a
rise in government spending raises the consumption-based price index (unless ? = 1).
In the steady state, when the economy returns to the labour supply curve, output
decreases relative to the short run output, and consequently the crowding-out effect is
bigger in the steady state (again, unless ? = 1). In the case when private and
government consumption are perfect substitutes a rise in government spending only
affects the composition of aggregate demand (private consumption is reduced on a
one-to-one basis), but leaves all other macroeconomic variables unaffected.
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3.2.3 Welfare Effects of Fiscal Expansion
As mentioned, one advantage of the NOEM framework is that it allows an explicit
utility-based welfare analysis of fiscal policy, and the analysis can thus be used as the
basis for the design of optimal fiscal policy. Analyzing the welfare effects of fiscal
policy is important, because unless economic models embody meaningful welfare
criteria, they can yield misleading policy prescriptions even for the problems they were
designed to address (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 625).
According to the utility function (1), fiscal policy can affect welfare by changing
private consumption, government consumption, real balances and output. As usual in
the NOEM literature, I focus on the real component of the utility function, neglecting
the welfare effect of real balances. The welfare effect of fiscal policy is the sum of
short-run change in utility and the discounted present value of the steady-state change
in utility. Since the economy reaches the steady state after one period, the
differentiated utility function is (see Appendix B)
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As shown in Appendix B, by substituting into (16) steady state output equation (9) and
the multipliers (11), (12), (14) and (15) derived, that a rise in government spending
does not affect welfare if ? = 1 and causes a fall in welfare if ? < 1. In the case when
governmentally provided goods are partial substitutes with private consumption the
negative welfare effect results from three factors. Firstly, the increase in output, both in
the short run and in the steady state, leads to a decrease in welfare. Secondly, in the
short run the rise in government consumption crowds out private consumption, which
decreases welfare. However, the fall in welfare caused by the crowding-out effect is
perfectly offset by the positive welfare effect that the rise in government spending
affects. Thirdly, expansive fiscal policy leads to a higher crowding-out effect in the
steady state than in the short run, and in the long-run the negative welfare effect that
crowding-out causes is larger than the positive welfare effect that higher government
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spending brings. All in all, the main reason for the beggar-thyself result of fiscal
expansion is that private consumption is reduced while government consumption is
increased: the total utility is lowered since one unit of government consumption gives
less utility than one unit of private consumption. Furthermore, the agents have to work
more to produce less utility enhancing government consumption.
Maintaining the assumption of ? < 1, the welfare effects also indicate a role for the
marginal rate of substitution between private and government consumption. This is a
consequence of three factors. The higher the substitutability, (i) the bigger is the direct
increase in utility, (ii) the smaller is the rise in output (iii) and the bigger is the direct
crowding-out effect on private consumption. The first two effects indicate that the
smaller the substitutability is the more a rise in government spending decreases
welfare. However, the third effect means the opposite. It could be shown that the first
two effects more than offset the third one. Consequently, the less fiscal policy
decreases welfare the higher is the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government consumption. This result is consistent with Ganelli (2003), who claimed
that the introduction of a positive ? unambiguously raises welfare compared to the
pure waste case.
However, in the case when private and government consumption are perfect substitutes
a rise in government spending does not lower welfare. In this case a rise in government
spending does not raise the output of nontraded goods and the direct increase in utility
from government spending perfectly offsets the negative welfare effect caused by
direct crowding-out. The result that fiscal expansion is never welfare-improving is in
contrast with Ganelli (2003), who concluded that the introduction of utility enhancing
government spending reverses the beggar-thyself welfare result on the specific
parameter values. A rise in welfare happens if the direct increase in utility from
government spending more than offsets the negative effects caused by decreased
private consumption and increased output. In this model, the positive welfare effect
that higher government spending brings is never enough to more offset the negative
welfare effect. Therefore, if a government in a small open economy desires to
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maximize the welfare of the representative agent, it should not implement fiscal
expansion.
4 Fiscal Policy, the Exchange Rate and the Current Account
The primary focus of this section is to examine how the effects of fiscal expansion
depend on the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. To
address this research agenda I develop a simple model in which the elasticity of
substitution between traded and nontraded goods is not restricted to a particular value
even if the model is numerically solved. Relatively few studies have examined the
effects of fiscal policy in calibrated versions of NOEM models. For example, Kim and
Roubini (2004, 11) point out that “[t]he effects of fiscal policy on the current account
and the real exchange rate in calibrated versions of these NOEM models are still
waiting to be analyzed.”
One of the biggest advantages of the NOEM framework, pioneered by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995, 1996 Section 10), is that it “incorporates the price rigidities essential to
explain exchange rate behavior without sacrificing the insights of the intertemporal
approach to the current account” (Obstfeld – Rogoff 1995, 624). The model presented
in this section uses the strengths of the NOEM framework by deriving the short-run
and long-run effects of fiscal expansion not only on the exchange rate and the current
account but also on several other macroeconomics variables. The model builds on the
monetary policy model developed by Lane (2001a). His model extended the small-
country model contained in the Appendix to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) by
introducing a utility function that is non-separable between tradables and nontradables
consumption. The main advantage of this specification of preferences is that in this
framework economic shocks to the nontraded goods sector affect tradables
consumption and consequently the current account. This framework, therefore, is well
equipped to study the effects of fiscal policy on the optimal time path of consumption
and external borrowing.
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4.1 A Model
4.1.1 Market Structure and Preferences
The basic structure of this model is identical to the one presented in Section 3. The
only difference between these two model is the intertemporal utility function which is
now given by
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In the utility function (17) Ut stands for utility at time t, b (0 < b < 1) is the discount
factor. The first term in (17) is the utility for consumption, where C is the overall
consumption index that aggregates consumption of traded and nontraded goods and ?
is the intertemporal elasticity of aggregate consumption. In equation (18) CT,t is
consumption of tradables at time t, ? is the share of tradables in total consumption, CN,t
is the private nontraded goods consumption index (to be defined below) and ? is the
elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. The second term in the
utility function (17) reflects the utility for holding real balances, where ? is the positive
parameter, Ms is nominal money balances held by the agent at time s, Ps is the
consumption-based price index (to be defined below) and ? is the money demand
parameter. The last term captures the disutility the agent experiences in having to
produce output, where ys(z) is the output of nontraded good z and k the positive
parameter.
The overall consumption index, given by (18), aggregates consumption of traded and
nontraded goods. As mentioned, CT,t is consumption of tradables. The variable CN,t is
the private nontraded goods consumption index, a CES aggregator of quantities of
different nontraded goods consumed:
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where c(z) is consumption of good z and µ (> 1) denotes the elasticity of substitution
between varieties of nontraded goods (the parameter also denotes the price elasticity of
demand of good z). Government expenditures are assumed to be pure waste and not to
affect private utility. Per capita government consumption, GN, is the government
consumption index that is aggregated in the same manner as private nontraded goods
consumption, and with the same elasticity of substitution
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where g(z) is government consumption of good z.
Home tradables are perfect substitutes with foreign-produced tradables, and the foreign
currency price of tradables is exogenously determined in the world market. There are
no costs or impediments to trade between the home country and the world market, and
thus the law of one price holds in tradables. The foreign currency price of tradables can
be normalized to unity, which then implies PT = E, where PT is the domestic currency
price of tradables and E is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the home currency
price of the foreign currency. The price of tradables, therefore, also stands for the
nominal exchange rate.
Given the level of aggregate consumption, the optimal allocation of expenditures
between traded and nontraded goods is given by
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In the preceding equations, P denotes the consumption-based price index and PN
denotes the nontraded goods price index. The preceding equations imply that the
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demands for goods are proportional to aggregate consumption with a proportionality
coefficient that is an isoelastic function of the ratio of the goods’ price to the
consumption-based price index. The consumption-based price index, defined as the
minimum expenditure required to purchase one unit of aggregate consumption, is
given by
(22) ( )[ ] qqq gg ---+= 1
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The nontraded goods price index, defined as the minimum expenditure required to
purchase one unit of a basket of nontraded goods, is given by
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where p(z) denotes the price of nontraded good z.
Making use of the constant-elasticity of substitution nontraded goods consumption
index, equation (19), and adding up private and government demands yields the
demand curve. The total demand for each nontraded good, therefore, is given by
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where superscript A denotes aggregates. This equation simply shows that that the
demand for each nontraded good depends on its relative price, the elasticity of
demand, and aggregate private and government (per-capita) expenditures.
4.1.2 Budget Constraints and Optimality Conditions
The intertemporal budget for the representative agent is written, in nominal terms, as
(24)
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where Bt denotes the stock of riskless real bonds (denominated in tradables) held by
the agent entering period t + 1. Mt is the agent’s money balances entering period t + 1,
r denotes the constant world net interest rate earned on bonds between periods t - 1 and
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t, tTy , is exogenously given quantity of tradables and ? denotes per capita taxes (in
units of nontraded goods).
The government finances its purchases through lump-sum taxes and seigniorage.
Under these assumptions, the government budget constraint, expressed in per capita
terms and in units of nontraded goods, can be written as
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The representative agent solves an intertemporal maximization problem, choosing the
levels of consumption, money holding, bond holding and the output of nontraded
goods that maximizes the discounted lifetime utility. To solve the first-order
conditions for the representative agent, equation (23) is used to eliminate pN,t(z) from
(24), and the utility function (17) is maximized subject to the resulting budget
constraint. The optimal behaviour of the representative agent is characterized by the
following optimality conditions (see Appendix C and note that the indexes denoting
the agents are dropped):
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Since the price of tradables also denotes the nominal exchange rate, the Fisher identity
implies uncovered interest parity. Equation (25) is the Euler equation governing the
optimal intertemporal allocation of tradables consumption. As noted by Dornbusch
(1983), the relevant real interest rate, for a small country with a nontraded goods
sector, is not the world interest rate but the interest rate stated in terms of the domestic
consumption basket. For example, if the consumption-based price index is relative to
the price of tradables is temporarily low relative to its future ratio the consumption-
based real interest rate is also temporarily low.6 This favours short-run over long-run
consumption and raises short-run consumption with elasticity ?. However, as the
consumption-based price index rises consumption of tradables becomes relatively
dearer, and consequently consumption of tradables falls as a fraction of aggregate
consumption with elasticity ? [recall equation (20)]. The interplay between ? and ?
determines whether consumption of tradables raises or drops. Equation (26) governs
the optimal intratemporal allocation of expenditures between traded and nontraded
goods. The optimal allocation of expenditures depends on the openness of the
economy, the relative price ratio and the elasticity of substitution between traded and
nontraded goods. Equation (27) is the labour-leisure trade-off condition. It states that
the marginal disutility of producing an extra unit of a nontraded good is equal to the
marginal utility from consuming the added revenue that the extra unit of the nontraded
good brings. Equation (28) is the money market equilibrium condition, which shows
that the demand for real balances is a positive function of aggregate consumption and a
negative function of the interest rate. It also shows that the demand of real money
balances is influenced by the consumption elasticity of money demand (1/?).
6 In this case, the relative price of tradables in terms of the consumption-based price index falls in the
long run. Then one unit of tradables borrowed at today has relatively much purchasing power in terms
of aggregate consumption today and costs a little in terms of aggregate consumption upon the repayment
of the loan next period. Since the loan adds more consumption today than it costs to repay tomorrow
with the falling relative price of tradables the real interest rate in terms of aggregate consumption (the
consumption-based real interest rate) is below the world interest rate. This argument directly follows
Dornbusch (1983, 145).
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4.1.3 The Current Account
The current account is defined as the sum of the trade balance and the services balance.
The trade balance is here the difference between the output of tradables and their
consumption. The services account is here the product of the stock of real bonds and
the world net interest rate earned on bonds. As standard in the literature, we consider
the steady state in which the initial stock of net foreign asset is zero. The short-run
current account identity, therefore, can be written as
(29) tTtTt CyB ,, -= .
Since the optimal intertemporal consumption of tradables is tilted by changes in the
prices and the output of tradables is constant current account behaviour can be non-
zero. This implies that fiscal expansion can generate current account imbalances, and
the economy (the representative agent) either accumulates net foreign assets or issues
foreign bonds in response to fiscal expansion.
Assume that the prices of nontraded goods are set one period in advance and that the
economy reaches the new steady state after one period. The steady-state current
account equation can be written as
(30) 0,1, TtTt CCrB -= + .
The current account imbalances in the short run determine the stock of net foreign
assets in the steady state. Should an economic shock induce a current account deficit in
the short run the economy must run a current account surplus in the steady state in
order to finance its net foreign debt services. On the other hand, should the economy
accumulate net foreign assets in the short run it uses interests earned on bonds for
steady-state consumption of tradables.
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4.1.4 A Symmetric Steady-State Equilibrium
The model is log-linearized around the flexible price steady state, in which all
exogenous variables are constant and the initial stock of net foreign asset and
government spending are both zero. In addition, we assume a symmetric equilibrium,
in which all agents consume and produce the same amount of all differentiated
nontraded goods and all prices are equal. In this symmetric equilibrium, equation (23)
implies that the demand for nontraded goods is given by
(31) NNN GCy += .
As in Lane (2001a), the endowment of tradables is normalized such that the relative
price of nontraded goods in terms of tradables is unity. In this symmetric steady state
yN,t = (1-?)Ct, therefore the labour-leisure trade-off condition (27), can be solved to
yield the steady-state output of nontraded goods
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This equation implies that due to monopolistic competition in the nontraded goods
sector the output of nontraded goods is suboptimally low in the decentralised
competitive equilibrium. As the elasticity of demand increases, the differentiated
nontraded goods become closer substitutes, and consequently the monopoly power
decreases.
4.1.5 The Log-Linear Version of the Model
As mentioned, the model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state which was
characterized above. The next step is to derive log-linear versions of all of the model's
key equations. Each variable is expressed in percentage deviations from the initial
(zero government spending) steady state. In the short run, nominal prices of nontraded
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goods are predetermined: they are set one period in advance and can be adjusted fully
after one period. It follows from this assumption that it takes one period to reach the
new steady state after a fiscal shock hits the economy.
The variables whose initial steady-state value is zero, government spending and
foreign bond holdings, are normalized by appropriate initial consumptions:
government spending is normalized by consumption of nontraded goods and net
foreign assets by consumption of tradables.
We begin with the aggregate consumption index, equation (18). The log-linearized
versions of it in the short run and in the steady state, respectively, are
(32) ( ) NT CCC ˆ1ˆˆ gg -+=  and
(33) ( ) NT CCC ˆ1ˆˆ gg -+= .
The short-run stickiness of the prices of nontraded goods means that 0ˆ =NP . Hence,
the log-linearized versions of the consumption-based price index (22) are
(18) TPP ˆˆ g=  and
(19) ( ) NT PPP ˆ1ˆˆ gg -+= .
The log-linearized versions of the demand curve for the representative agent, equation
(31), are
(36) NNN GCy ˆˆˆ +=  and
(37) NNN GCy
ˆˆˆ += .
The log-linearized version of the optimal intertemporal consumption of tradables,
equation (25), is
(38) ( )( ) ( )( )TTTT PPPPCC ˆˆˆˆˆˆ -----=- qsqs .
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This equation illustrates that to the extent that shocks to the nontraded goods sector
affect the relative price ratio (P, PT) over time, they also affect the optimal time path of
consumption of tradables and consequently the current account.
The log-linearized versions of the optimal allocation of expenditures between traded
and nontraded goods link changes in consumption of traded and nontraded goods.
Equation (26) takes the log-linear forms
(39) TTN PCC ˆˆˆ q=-  and
(40) ( )TNTN PPCC ˆˆˆˆ --=- q .
The assumption of sticky prices introduces a typical Keynesian feature into the model:
Output becomes entirely demand-determined for a small enough rise in government
spending. The labour-leisure trade-off condition, therefore, is required to hold only in
the steady-run. Together, the log-linearized versions of equation (27) and the
optimized relationship between CN and C [equation (21)] imply
(41) ( ) NNNN GCPPy ˆ1ˆ11ˆˆ1ˆ1 mmss
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The log-linearized versions of the money-demand equation (28), making use of the
optimized relationship between CT and C [equation (20)], can be written as
(42) ( ) ( )TTTT PPrPPCP ˆˆ
1ˆˆˆ1ˆ -+-+=-
s
q
s
e   and
(43) ( )PPCP TT ˆˆˆ1ˆ -+=- s
q
s
e .
In equation (44) the real interest rate and the discount rate are tied down by the
familiar condition
b
b-
=
1r .
Finally, the current account equations (29) and (30), given the constant endowment of
tradables, take the log-linear forms
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(44) TCB ˆˆ -=  and
(45) TCBr
ˆ=ˆ .
Equations (44) and (45) together imply that an increase (decrease) Bˆ in per-capita net
foreign assets increases (decreases) steady-state consumption of tradables by the
amount Br sˆince the output of tradables is exogenous.
Equations (32) – (45) fully describe the equilibrium dynamics of the model. Having
laid out the equations of the model, we now turn to the analysis of the effects of fiscal
expansion.
4.2 The Effects of Fiscal Expansion: A Special Case
The log-linear equations would allow us to solve for closed-form solutions for the
short-run and steady-state effects of fiscal expansion.7 However, a numerical solution
of the model can be used to illustrate the effects of fiscal expansion. Nonetheless, we,
for a start, solve for an analytical solution of the model in a simple special case. To
simplify the analysis we assume a logarithmic utility for consumption and real money
balances, which corresponds to ? = ? = 1. In addition, we assume that the elasticity of
substitution between traded and nontraded goods is also unity (? = 1).
In the case where ? = ? = 1, as pointed out by Lane (2001a), the utility function is log-
separable in consumption of traded and nontraded goods. Equation (38) reveals that in
this case the optimal intertemporal profile of tradables consumption is perfectly flat.
Since the output of tradables is constant and initial net foreign assets are zero the
economy has always a balanced current account regardless of shock to the output or
consumption of nontraded goods.
7 Lane (2001a) used this solution technique to solve for the effects of an exogenous rise in the money
supply.
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Together the steady-state market clearing condition for nontraded goods (37) and the
labour-leisure trade-off condition (41) imply that
(46) NN GC
ˆ
2
1ˆ -=  and
(47) NN Gy
ˆ
2
1ˆ = .
The steady-state output of nontraded goods increases as the agents respond to a rise in
government spending by substituting into work out of leisure. Consequently, private
consumption falls by less than the rise in government spending.
Substitution (46) into the log-linearized version of the money demand function that
makes use of the optimized relationship between CN and C [equation (21)]8 yields to
(48) NN GP
ˆ
2
1ˆ = .
The preceding equation indicates that a rise in government spending raises the
nontraded goods price index. Higher government spending leads to an outward shift in
the demand curve facing the agents, therefore allowing them to raise their prices.
Furthermore, the rise in the price index is proportional to that in the output of
nontraded goods.
Substituting equations (46) and (48) into equation (40) yields to
(49) 0ˆ =TP .
The startling implication of this equation is that a rise in government spending does
not affect the nominal exchange rate in the steady state (the price of tradables also
denotes the nominal exchange rate). The economic intuition behind this result is the
following: the allocation of total consumption spending between traded and nontraded
goods implies that in an optimal case the ratio of marginal utilities of traded and
nontraded goods equals the relative price of tradables in terms of nontraded goods.
Consumption of tradables does not change, consequently the marginal utility of
8 The money demand function can be now written as
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tradables consumption is constant. The fall in nontraded goods consumption increases
the marginal utility of nontraded goods consumption. Therefore, an adjustment in the
relative price ration is needed in order to maintain the allocation of total consumption
in optimum. As shown, a rise in government spending raises the price of nontraded
goods and crowds out nontraded goods consumption. These effects guarantee that the
ratio of marginal utilities equals the relative price ratio without an adjustment in the
price of tradables.
Together, the rise in the nontraded goods price index and the unaffected price of
tradables have two consequences. Firstly, the steady-state change in the consumption-
based price index (35) is determined by the rise in the nontraded goods price index and
the share of nontraded goods in total consumption. Secondly, a rise in government
spending appreciates the equilibrium real exchange rate which is defined as the price
of tradables in terms of nontraded goods. Defined this way the equilibrium real
exchange rate represents an internal terms of trade measuring how much of nontraded
goods must be given up for one unit of tradables in the steady state. Since a rise in
government spending appreciates the equilibrium real exchange rate, it thus improves
the economy’s steady-state terms of trade.
The next step is to solve for the short-run effects of a rise in government spending.
Substituting the market clearing condition (36) into the money market equilibrium
condition that makes use of the optimized relationship between CN and C yields to
(50) 0ˆ =NC .
Substituting this equation into (36) yields to
(51) NN Gy ˆˆ = .
This equation clearly shows that a rise in government spending increases the output of
nontraded goods. Furthermore, in this special case the “balanced budget multiplier” is
exactly one in the short run. Since a rise in government spending increases output on a
one-to-one basis it does not crowd out private consumption, as equation (50)
illustrates.
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Since consumption of traded and nontraded goods are both unaffected, equation (39)
shows that
(52) 0ˆ =TP .
A rise in government spending, as the preceding equation brings out, does not affect
the nominal exchange rate in the short run. This is a consequence of two factors.
Firstly, a rise in government spending does not affect money demand. The money
demand function (28) shows that in the case where ? = 1 the short-run money demand
is proportional to aggregate consumption. Since aggregate consumption does not
change the unaffected money demand leaves the nominal exchange rate unaffected.
Secondly, since neither traded nor nontraded goods consumption changes the ratio of
marginal utilities of traded and nontraded goods equals the relative price ratio without
an adjustment in the price of tradables.
4.3 The Effects of Fiscal Expansion: The General Case
4.3.1 The Calibration of the Model
The log-linear equations would allow us to solve for closed-form solutions of the
model also in the general case. Alternatively, a numerical solution of the model can be
used to illustrate, in a tractable way, the effects of a rise in government spending.
Seven short-run and seven steady-state variables are to be determined. Fourteen
equations that jointly determine them are (32) – (45). In order to solve the model
numerically, it can be written in the matrix form Ax = B, where the matrix A (14 x 14)
contains the structural parameters of the equations, the vector x (14 x 1) contains the
endogenous variables of the equations and the vector B (14 x 1) contains the
exogenous shock (a rise in government spending). In this case, the model can be
solved by using linear algebra, as the solution of the model can then be written as x =
A-1B.
In order to solve the model numerically, values for six parameters are required: the
intertemporal elasticity of aggregate consumption, the share of tradables in total
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consumption, the consumption elasticity of money demand, the elasticity of
substitution between traded and nontraded goods, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of nontraded goods and the real interest rate. We focus attention on how the
effects of fiscal expansion depend on the marginal rate of substitution between traded
and nontraded goods. This parameter, therefore, is not restricted to a particular value,
but it is analyzed how the solution of the model depends on this parameter value. We
let this elasticity of substitution to be between 0.4 and 4.9 In the calibration, we assume
a logarithmic utility for consumption, which corresponds to ? = 1. This is a standard
assumption, and one that would render the model compatible with a balanced growth
path if trend technological progress was introduced (see e.g. King, Plosser and Rebelo
1988). Stockman and Tesar (1995) estimated that nontraded goods make up about half
of output, and thus ? is set to 0.5. Mankiw and Summers (1986) estimated the
consumption elasticity of money demand (1/? in this model) to be very close unity, so
it is chosen a value ? = 1. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of nontraded
goods is set to 6, which implies a 20 percent mark-up in the steady state. This is
consistent with the mark-up estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and it is
widely used in related work. Finally, the real interest rate is chosen to be 4 percent.
(Print of the Mathematica file that solves the baseline case of the model is at end this
thesis.)
4.3.2 The Effects of a Permanent Rise in Government Spending
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the effects of a 1 percent rise in government spending
(relative to initial consumption of nontraded goods)10. In all diagrams, the horizontal
axis marks the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods and the
9 There is limited evidence on this elasticity of substitution in the empirical macroeconomics literature.
Mendoza (1991) estimate this elasticity of substitution to be 0.74, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) report
estimates in the range of 0.66 to 1.3 (for developing countries) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) find an
estimate as low as 0.44.
10 In the case of a permanent increase 1ˆˆ == NN GG .
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vertical axis marks the variable’s percentage deviation from the initial steady state.11
To illuminate how the interplay between ? and ? influences the current account and
nominal exchange rate responses to a rise in government spending, three cases can be
distinguished to consider: (i) ? = ? = 1, (ii) ? > ? = 1 and (iii) ? < ?  = 1.
In case (i) the solution of the model corresponds to the special case that was presented
in Section 4. Figure 1 indicates the result that a rise in government spending affects
nothing other than the output of nontraded goods on a one-to-one basis leaving all
other variables unaffected in the short run. As mentioned, in the case where ? = ? = 1
the utility function is log-separable in consumption of traded and nontraded goods. In
this case the optimal intertemporal profile of tradables consumption is perfectly flat, as
the intra- and intertemporal substitution effects cancel out each others. Therefore,
although a rise in government spending affects the relative price ratio (P, PT) in the
steady state this price ratio change has to influence on consumption of tradables and
consequently on the current account. As noted previously, in the case where ? = 1 the
short-run money demand is proportional to aggregate consumption, therefore the
unchanged money demand leaves the nominal exchange rate unaffected. Figure 2
illustrates that in the steady state a 1 percent rise in government spending, among
others, increases the output of nontraded goods by a half percent and raises the
nontraded goods price index by a half percent as equations (47) and (48) indicate,
respectively.
In case (ii), as can be seen from Figure 1, a rise in government spending increases
nontraded goods consumption and production, decreases tradables and aggregate
consumption, depreciates the nominal exchange rate and induces a current account
surplus in the short run. Since the short-run money demand is proportional to
aggregate consumption a fall in aggregate consumption tends to lower money demand
11 As noted previously, the model is log-linearized around the steady state, in which net foreign assets
holdings is zero and the change in net foreign assets is normalized by consumption of tradables. The
current account diagram, therefore, shows by how much the current account changes relative to initial
consumption of tradables. In addition, the real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of tradables
in terms of nontraded goods.
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requiring a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate in order to maintain equilibrium
in the money market. This depreciation and the sticky prices in the nontraded goods
sector imply that the relative price of tradables rises, which encourages the agents to
switch their consumption towards nontraded goods. The strength of this effect depends
on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. On
the other hand, since the aggregate price level relative to the price of tradables is
currently low relative to its future ratio, the consumption-based real interest rate is
temporarily low. This low consumption-based real interest rate induces the agents to
switch consumption from the future to the present. The strength of this effect depends
on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The intra- and intertemporal substitution
effects on short-run consumption of tradables pull in opposite directions. Since ? > ?,
the intratemporal substitution effect wins out and consequently consumption of
tradables decreases. This reduction in consumption of tradables in turn induces a short-
run current account surplus, which implies a permanent improvement in the
economy’s net foreign assets. In the steady state this entails a permanent services
balance surplus, which is used to finance a trade balance deficit. This trade balance
deficit allows consumption of tradables to remain permanently above the endowment
of tradables. Nonetheless, the raise in steady-state consumption of tradables is fairly
small.
In case (iii), a rise in government spending, contrary to the previous case, appreciates
the nominal exchange rate, increases tradables and aggregate consumption and
generates a current account surplus in the short run. Interestingly, a one percent rise in
government spending increases the output of nontraded goods by more than one
percent in spite of the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Increased aggregate
consumption raises money demand, which tends to raise the interest rate. An
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, therefore, is required to balance money
demand and supply. This appreciation raises the relative price of nontraded goods,
which favours substitution from traded to nontraded goods. However, this negative
effect on consumption of nontraded goods is more than offset by the positive effect. As
in the previous case, also in this case the aggregate price level relative to the price of
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tradables is currently low relative to its future value. The consumption-based real
interest rate, therefore, is temporarily low, which induces the agents to switch
consumption from the steady state to the short run thus also increasing consumption of
nontraded goods. Since ? is now low, implying little substitutability in consumption
between traded and nontraded goods, the relative strength of the intertemporal
substitution is low. The intratemporal effect, therefore, dominates increasing
consumption of nontraded goods in spite of the appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. From the above discussion, it should be clear that the intratemporal and
intertemporal substitution effects increase consumption of tradables thereby generating
a short-run current account deficit. This in turn induces a permanent reduction in net
foreign assets. In the steady state this entails a permanent services balance deficit,
which must be financed by a trade balance surplus. In order to achieve a trade balance
surplus, consumption of tradables must remain permanently below the endowment of
tradables.
Figure 2 illustrates that a rise in government spending raises the steady-state output of
nontraded goods. Output raises as the agents respond to a rise in government spending
by substituting into work out of leisure. There can be, in some cases, negative effects
on labour supply, as explained in a moment, but they are more then offset by the
positive effects. Consequently, consumption of nontraded goods falls by less than the
rise in government spending. As stressed by Lane (2001a), net foreign assets have
effects on the level of desired consumption of nontraded goods and on the optimal
labour supply, and these effects on the output of nontraded goods pull in opposite
directions. Firstly, due to the nonseparability between traded and nontraded goods
consumption the change in steady-state consumption of tradables affect the desired
consumption of nontraded goods. For example, in the case where ? < ? the declined
steady-state consumption of tradables induces a decline in desired consumption of
nontraded goods, which tends to lower the output of nontraded goods. However, this
effect plays only a minor role here since output raises by the most in the case where
this effects tends to reduce output. Secondly, short-run current account imbalances
have a wealth effect on the optimal labour supply: As equation (27) shows, higher
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consumption induces a reduction in labour supply. Therefore, if the economy
accumulated net foreign assets in the short run, higher wealth leads to some reduction
in labour supply. For this reason, output raises by less than in the case where the
current account remained in balance in the short run. On the other hand, if a rise in
government spending generated a current account deficit, lower wealth leads to some
increase in labour supply and output.
As Figure 2 illustrates, a rise in government spending appreciates the equilibrium real
exchange rate and raises the nontraded goods price index in the steady state. Higher
government spending leads to an outward shift in the demand curve facing the agents,
therefore allowing them to raise their prices. Furthermore, this rise in the price index is
proportional to the rise in the output of nontraded goods. In the steady state, as before,
a rise in government spending appreciates the nominal exchange rate appreciates if ? <
?. Indeed, the nominal exchange rate jumps immediately to its steady-state level
despite the stickiness of the prices of nontraded goods in the short run.12 The
equilibrium real exchange rate was defined as the price of tradables in terms of
nontraded goods. As Figure 2 illustrates, a rise in government spending appreciates the
equilibrium real exchange rate, improving the economy’s steady-state terms of trade.
The change in the equilibrium real exchange rate is required to lead the agents to
revise their consumption allocation between traded and nontraded goods in a
consistent way. Since the steady-state trade balance needs to change to reach a
particular value, the equilibrium exchange rate has to change accordingly. It has to
appreciate adequately to induce the agents to change their consumption allocation in a
way consistent with the required change in the steady-state trade balance.
12 As later shown, exchange overshooting (undershooting) takes place if ? is bigger (smaller) than one.
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4.3.3 The Effects of a Temporary Rise in Government Spending
We now turn to examining the effects of a temporary rise in government spending. A
temporary rise in government spending is assumed to last for one period, and as
before, the price of nontraded goods are sticky in short run and the economy reaches
the new steady state after one period.13 A temporary rise in government spending can
have effects on the steady state, because of induced wealth changes through short-run
current account imbalances. If fiscal policy induced short-run wealth changes, these
changes would to affect the optimal labour supply and output in the steady state.
Consequently, fiscal policy would affect the economy well beyond the time frame of a
temporary rise in government spending.
Surprisingly, a one percent temporary rise in government spending raises the short-run
output of nontraded goods by one percent (for all values of the elasticity of substitution
between traded and nontraded goods consumption) but it leaves all other endogenous
variables unaffected both in the short run and in the steady state. Therefore, even
though a temporary rise in government spending induces a tilt into the time profile of
aggregate demand, it does not introduce a tilt in the time profile of output net of
government consumption. It is interesting to notice that the effects of a rise in
government spending in the short run differ largely depending on whether a rise
government spending is permanent or temporary.
The intuition behind the result, that a temporary rise in government spending affects
nothing other than the short-run output of nontraded goods, is rather straightforward.
Together unaffected consumptions of traded and nontraded goods imply that the
unchanged pressure on money demand leaves also the nominal exchange rate
unaffected. With the nominal exchange rate been unchanged and the price of
13 In the case of a temporary increase 1ˆ =NG  and 0
ˆ =NG .
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nontraded goods fixed, the relative price ratio (P, PT) also remains constant in the short
run. Again, this relative price ratio remains constant also in the steady state. A
temporary rise in government spending does not affect this price ratio either today or
tomorrow and consequently the optimal intertemporal profile of consumption of
tradables is perfectly flat for all values of the elasticity of substitution between traded
and nontraded goods. The constant consumption of tradables has two implications.
Firstly, with no effect on consumption of tradables the assumption that the government
spends exclusively on nontraded goods isolates the shock to the nontraded goods
sector and thus the short-run output of nontraded goods raises on a one-to-one basis.
Secondly, a temporary rise in government spending does not induce short-run current
account imbalances that would affect the optimal labour supply and output in the
steady state. Fiscal policy, therefore, does not affect the economy beyond the time
frame of a temporary rise in government spending.
The finding, that a temporary rise in government spending affects nothing other than
the short-run output of nontraded goods, can be interpreted as providing favourable
evidence for the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Temporary
changes in government spending, that last no longer than price rigidities and are used
to purchase only nontraded goods, are an effective stabilization tool when used wisely
and timely in response to undesired fluctuations in output. Undesired fluctuations in
domestic output can be perfectly offset by an opposite change in government spending.
Most significantly, this can be done without causing any side-effects.
4.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis: The Role of Openness and Money Demand
In this section, we explore to what extent the effects of a rise in government spending
represented above may be sensitive to the calibration of two central parameters
characterizing the small open economy: the degree of openness and the consumption
elasticity of money demand. To begin with, we can discover that changing these
parameters does not influence the effects of temporary fiscal expansion.
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Figure 3 illustrates the consequences of changing the share of tradables in total
consumption to 0.2. As can be seen from Figure 3, a rise in government spending
induces a smaller effect on the output of nontraded goods and a larger effect on
tradables consumption in the more closed economy in the short run. The main reason
behind these changes is the change in the nominal exchange rate. The greater change
in the nominal exchange rate causes greater intratemporal consumption switching
which increases tradables consumption and decreases nontraded goods consumption
relative to the baseline case. Due to the change in tradables consumption, the current
account alters by less in the more open economy. However, one should recall that the
current account is normalized by initial consumption of traded goods. Hence, a rise in
government spending influences the current account, relative to total consumption, by
more in the more open economy. Since the share of tradables in total consumption is
low, the wealth effect due to current account imbalances induces a smaller effect on
the optimal labour supply than in the baseline case. Figure 4 also illustrates that the
degree of openness has little influence on the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Finally, we explore the consequences of changing the consumption elasticity of money
demand. This elasticity is critical for the response of the nominal exchange rate.
Helliwell, Conkerline and Lafrance (1990) estimate a large number of money demand
elasticises for G7 countries. The estimates of money demand elasticises suggests that ?
> 1, and thus we change to this parameter to 1.5.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the consequences of changing the consumption elasticity of
money demand. It emerges from the Figures that this parameter has the biggest
influence on the nominal exchange rate and the short-run output (and consumption) of
nontraded goods. In this case, the nominal exchange rate depreciates if ? > 1.5. In
general, the nominal exchange rate always depreciates in the short run if ? > ?, and
appreciates if ? < ?. Due to the smaller rise in the output of nontraded goods aggregate
consumption is lower than in the baseline case. This has its own effect on money
demand; however, the main reason for the different exchange rate response to a rise in
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government spending is the altered consumption elasticity of money demand. The
higher ? induces higher demand for real money balances, and the nominal exchange
has to change accordingly to balance money demand and supply. The change in the
nominal exchange rate leads up to intratemporal consumption substitution. Anyway,
the main reason for the lower rise in output is the increased demand for real money
balances which thus decreases consumption of nontraded goods.
Figures 4 and 5 also illustrate that the change in the consumption elasticity of money
demand has only a modest effect on the current account and an infinitesimal effect on
steady-state output and the real equilibrium exchange rate. Due to the small change in
tradables consumption the current account changes only by little relative to the
baseline case. Thus, the change in wealth causes only an infinitesimal effect on the
optimal labour supply in the steady state. Although the consumption elasticity of
money demand affects the nominal exchange rate in the steady state it has only an
infinitesimal effect on the real equilibrium exchange rate. In addition, monetary
equilibrium requires overshooting of the nominal exchange rate. Generally,
overshooting takes place if ? > 1, which is the same overshooting condition as in the
small-country monetary policy model by Obstfeld-Rogoff (1995, Appendix; 1996,
689-694).
As the analysis above shows, temporary and permanent changes in government
spending have different effects in the short run. In the baseline case (? = 1), a
permanent rise in government spending raises output more than a temporary one
(unless ? = 1), where as in the case of ? = 1.5 the opposite result is more likely. In
closed economy models, Hall (1980) argue that temporary changes in government
spending have larger effects than permanent ones, as against e.g. Aiyagari, Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992) and Baxter and King (1993) find the opposite result. In the
above-mentioned models, the main reason behind the result that the effects of
permanent changes have larger effects is that they cause a larger increase in investment
in the short run. In this model, the optimal consumption response alone explains why
permanent changes might have bigger effects that temporary ones.
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It is also worth observing that the findings on the output effects of a rise in government
spending are rather consistent with the range of multipliers obtained using a variety of
macroeconometric models. Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) survey the empirical
literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. They conclude that “[t]he range of
estimated short-run multipliers is wide, (… ), but most expenditure multipliers are in
the range 0.6 to 1.4.” The surveyed results also support the view that long-run
multipliers are smaller that short-run multipliers.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This thesis presents two models to study the macroeconomic effects of permanent
balanced-budget fiscal expansion in a small open economy under a flexible exchange
rate regime. This thesis illustrates that the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy are
sensitive to the exact specification of preferences. The first model attempts to fill in the
gap in the literature by analyzing the effects of fiscal expansion in a small open
economy in a framework where fiscal policy shocks can have a direct crowding-out
effect on private consumption. It demonstrates how the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal policy largely depend on the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government spending. The second model shows how the effects depend on the
elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods consumption.
In the first model, fiscal expansion raises the output of nontraded goods and crowds
out private nontraded goods consumption. The magnitudes of the effects depend on the
time horizon and the marginal rate of substitution between private and government
spending. The rise in output is bigger in the short run, when prices are sticky and
output demand-determined, whereas the crowding-out effect is bigger in the long run.
The higher the substitutability between private and government consumption, (i) the
bigger is the crowding out effect on private consumption (ii) and the smaller is the
positive effect on output. These results are consistent with Ganelli (2003), who showed
that the introduction of useful government spending tends to reduce consumption and
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output relative to the pure waste case. The detailed utility-based welfare analysis
shows that fiscal expansion does not induce a rise in domestic welfare, even if
government spending directly affects private utility. This result is in contrast with
Ganelli (2003), who concluded that the introduction of utility enhancing government
spending reverses the beggar-thyself welfare result on the specific parameter values.
The second model of this thesis demonstrates how the effects of fiscal policy depend
on the substitutability between traded and nontraded goods. One advantage of the fully
dynamic model is that is allows fiscal policy to induce tilts into the time profile of
output and relative prices. The model brings in important insights into the effects of
fiscal policy in small open economies under flexible exchange rates. This study reveals
that, under a specific parameterization, a one percent permanent rise in government
spending increases the output of nontraded goods by at least one percent in the short
run. Moreover, it is shown that fiscal expansion increases output by more than one
percent also in the situation where the nominal exchange rate appreciates.
Notwithstanding the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, output rises because a
change in relative prices induces consumers to choose a profile of consumption that is
tilted towards the present. Open economy models in which a rise in government
spending does not lead to any tilting into the time profile of relative prices and the
consumption-based real interest rate do not allow for this effect. It is also shown that
permanent fiscal expansion is the most expansionary in the case where the long-run
real exchange rate appreciates the most. In addition, it is demonstrated that the sign of
the current account response to permanent fiscal expansion depends on the interplay
between the intratemporal elasticity of aggregate consumption and the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods.
Finally, it is interesting to perceive that the short-run effects of a rise in government
spending differ largely depending on whether a rise government spending is permanent
or temporary. The finding, that a temporary rise in government spending affects
nothing other than the short-run output of nontraded goods, can be interpreted as
providing favourable evidence for the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilization
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tool. Temporary changes in government spending are an effective stabilization tool
when used wisely and timely in response to undesired fluctuations in domestic output.
Undesired fluctuations in output can be perfectly offset by an opposite change in
government spending without causing any side-effects.
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Appendix A. Solving for the First-Order Conditions
Equation (3) can be manipulated to yield
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This equation is substituted into the budget constraint (5), and then one can write the
appropriate Lagrangean as (the indexed denoting the agents are dropped)
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Substituting (A1) into (A4) yields
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, the ratio of the marginal utilities of tradables and
nontraded goods equals the relative price ratio.
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 Substituting (A2) into (A3) yields
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Equation (A5) can be written by using (A1) and multiplying by PT,t to yield
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utility form holding money, second term is utility from using today’s money for
tomorrow’s consumption and the term on the left-hand side is utility from spending
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Appendix B. Deriving the Welfare Effects of Fiscal Expansion
Log-linearizing the utility function (1) one can get (ignoring real balances)
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Dividing this equation by ? and substituting into this equations (9), (11), (12), (13) and
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Appendix C. Solving for the Optimality Conditions
To solve the first-order conditions for the representative agent, we use (23) to
eliminate pN,t(z) from (24), and then maximize the utility function (17) subject to the
resulting budget constraint. From equation (23) we can get
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By substituting this equation into the budget constraint (24), we can thus write the
Lagrangean as (the indexed denoting agents are dropped):
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Substituting (C1) into (C2) yields to
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Figure 1. The effects of a permanent rise in government spending
The horizontal axis marks the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded
goods and the vertical axis marks the variable’s percentage deviation from the initial
steady state.
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Figure 2. The effects of a permanent rise in government spending
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Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis, the role of openness
The solid line ? = 0.5, the dashed line ? = 0.2
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Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis, the role of money demand
The solid line ? = 1, the dashed line ? = 1.5
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Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis, the role of money demand
The solid line ? = 1, the dashed line ? = 1.5
